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In the summer of 2000, central banks from the Group of Ten countries surveyed large
international banks about their use of stress tests—a risk management tool that measures a
firm’s exposure to extreme movements in asset prices. The survey findings highlight the risks
that most concern financial institutions and clarify how these institutions use stress tests in
their overall risk management programs.
In recent years, large financial institutions have made
stress tests a key tool in assessing the sensitivity of their
businesses to sharp changes in asset prices. Like other
risk measurement tools, stress tests gauge how the value
of an institution’s portfolio of securities and derivatives
will be affected by large movements in, say, stock prices
or exchange rates. What sets stress tests apart from simi-
lar tools, however, is their ability to measure directly how
a particular economic or financial event—typically an
extreme event such as a stock market crash—will affect
the profitability of an institution’s portfolio at a specified
point in time.1
Stress tests are of considerable interest to central banks
because many of the tests used by financial institutions
simulate the effects of the large financial shocks that can
undermine the normal functioning of markets and impair
market liquidity. To shed light on such events and to iden-
tify the risks of greatest concern to financial institutions,
central bank representatives from the Group of Ten (G-10)
countries in the summer of 2000 conducted a survey of
stress tests used by large international financial institutions.
In this edition of Current Issues, we provide an overview of
the survey and summarize its principal findings. The com-
plete report, A Survey of Stress Tests and Current Practice
at Major Financial Institutions, is available from the
Committee on the Global Financial System (CGFS 2001).
The survey results reveal much about banks’ risk con-
cerns. Although stock market crashes and emerging market
crises are the most common scenarios tested, the risks
covered by the stress tests span all major asset classes and
all geographic areas. Moreover, despite broad similarities
in the types of risks tested, individual stress test scenarios
often differ markedly across banks, suggesting that risk
managers tailor their scenarios to their banks’ positions,
business lines, and risk appetite.
The survey findings also cast light on the role of stress
tests in risk management. Banks rely on stress tests to
assess exposures in those asset markets where illiquid con-
ditions and poor historical data make the use of other risk
measures difficult. In addition, risk managers see stress
tests as an effective means of communicating risks to bank
senior management.
What Are Stress Tests?
Stress tests are designed to answer such questions as “If
the stock market falls 20 percent, how much will the value
of my firm’s portfolio of securities, loans, and derivatives
change?” or “If U.S. interest rates increase 100 basis points,
how much will the value of my firm’s portfolio rise or
fall?” In conducting firm-wide stress tests, banks measure
the impact of such extreme changes, or “shocks,” across
all their business lines and trading operations.
The two most common types of stress tests are sensi-
tivity stress tests and stress test scenarios. A sensitivity
stress test measures the impact on a portfolio’s value of a
large change in a particular asset price or in a small
number of tightly linked asset prices. One of the standard
sensitivity stress tests used by risk managers measures the
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effect of a parallel shift in the yield curve—that is, an
identical change in the yields on short- and long-term
bonds. The survey findings regarding sensitivity stress
testing are discussed in detail in CGFS (2001). 
A stress test scenario—the chief focus of this article—
is more complicated. This type of stress test measures the
effect on a firm’s portfolio of simultaneous extreme
moves in several different asset prices—for example,
equity prices, exchange rates, interest rates, and interest
rate spreads. It can be based on a significant market event
in the past (a historical scenario) or on a plausible market
event that has yet to happen (a hypothetical scenario).
Stress tests are considered complements to firms’
other risk management tools, particularly value-at-risk
(VaR) models. VaR models provide a statistical measure
of the maximum loss in value that a firm’s portfolio is
likely to sustain over a given time horizon as a result of
changes in market prices or rates.2 Because VaR models
use average historical correlations among asset prices to
make such statistical assessments, they have limited abil-
ity to capture the risks of exceptional market events, espe-
cially those in which asset prices move in ways that differ
sharply from historical norms. In contrast, stress tests are
designed to mimic specific large market shocks, indepen-
dent of statistical relationships. Thus, stress testing
requires risk managers to make informed judgments
about the appropriate design and plausibility of different
stress test scenarios.
Purpose and Scope of the Stress Test Survey
In 2000, the Committee on the Global Financial System, a
group established by the G-10 central bank governors to
discuss issues related to financial market stability, formed
a task force to conduct a census of stress test scenarios.3
The task force had three goals: to learn more about the
role of stress testing in risk management, to identify the
exceptional financial and economic events considered
by market participants to pose significant risks to
profitability, and to develop information on the hetero-
geneity of risk taking across banks at a point in time.
The survey asked risk managers of financial institu-
tions to list the most important stress test scenarios run for
all business lines and positions of the firm. In addition,
for each firm-wide scenario, risk managers were asked to
identify the key risk factors or asset prices. Lastly, the sur-
vey asked several questions about how the firms conduct
stress tests and how they use their results in their overall
risk management systems.4 In follow-up interviews, risk
managers from several of the reporting institutions com-
mented on survey results and clarified their responses.
Forty-three commercial and investment banks from ten
countries participated in the census; they reported 293 stress
test scenarios. To facilitate peer group comparisons, the
CGFS task force divided reporting banks into two groups.
“Global dealer banks” comprise nineteen institutions active
worldwide as market makers trading in all types of financial
instruments, including derivatives. “Other internationally
active banks”—the remaining twenty-four institutions—
regularly conduct business outside their home country but
generally focus on a limited set of markets.5
We note two caveats regarding the census results.
First, although banks stress-test what they regard as
important risks, they have many different reasons for
judging a particular risk to be important. For example, a
bank might use a stress test to monitor those markets or
business lines in which it has a very large exposure, to
monitor hedge positions that it considers vulnerable to
extreme market movements, or to ensure that it is not
exposed to a particular extreme financial event. Thus, a
bank’s stress tests are related to its asset and derivatives
positions, but are not mirror images of them. In addition,
stress tests do not necessarily reflect a bank’s perception
of the likelihood of a given event.
Second, the results present a portrait of stress tests in
use on May 31, 2000. Because market conditions and
banks’exposures have changed since then, the stress tests
in use at the reporting institutions have undoubtedly
evolved. However, respondents noted that firm-wide
stress tests are reviewed frequently but changed infre-
quently. One reason for this practice is that repeating
stress tests on a regular basis is considered a useful way
to monitor how a firm’s exposure changes over time.
What the Survey Shows about Bank Perceptions of Risk
The 293 stress test scenarios reported by the banks fall
into nine broad categories or “themes.” Four of these
themes relate to events within particular asset markets—
equities, interest rates, credit spreads, and commodities.
The scenarios associated with these themes typically cen-
ter on a shock to market rates or prices. Another four
themes relate to events in different geographical areas—
Europe, Japan, North America, and the emerging market
countries. These scenarios tend to center on conditions
such as a sustained currency appreciation or market-wide
stress within countries. The final theme, designated
“other,” encompasses a variety of scenarios, many reflect-
ing volatility shocks to options markets.
A breakdown of the scenarios by theme highlights the
risks that most concern financial institutions as a group
(Chart 1). We measure the prevalence of each theme in
two ways—by the number of banks running one or more
stress tests for that theme and by the total number of sce-
narios tested for the theme. When the number of banks is
the measure, the four most common themes for stress test-
ing are equity prices, interest rates, emerging markets,
and credit or liquidity spreads. The results are similar
when the total number of scenarios is the measure, except
that emerging markets is the most prevalent theme.If we compare the stress test themes favored by the two
groups of reporting banks, some differences emerge
(Chart 2). Global dealer banks place particular emphasis
on scenarios focusing on equities, emerging markets, and
credit or liquidity spreads. While other internationally
active banks also emphasize such scenarios, they accord
noticeably greater importance to scenarios relating to
interest rates, Europe, and Japan than do the global dealer
banks. These differences may reflect the nature of risk tak-
ing at the two groups of institutions. Banks operating in a
limited number of foreign markets are likely to favor
interest rate scenarios because their risk exposures are
more closely linked to traditional banking businesses;
similarly, these banks are likely to choose regional stress
scenarios because their exposures are often tied to their
home markets.
A more detailed breakdown of the survey data provides
additional information about the banks’ risk concerns.
Table 1 lists specific types of scenarios within each theme
and reports the frequency with which each type was
tested. In this accounting, the most common scenarios are
Black Monday 1987 (run by twenty banks), a widening of
spreads in credit markets (fifteen banks), and a hypo-
thetical stock market crash (thirteen banks).
The numbers in the table also show that financial insti-
tutions see their risks as asymmetrical. That is, banks are
much more likely to stress-test crashes in equity prices and
emerging markets than to test booms. Similarly, banks
tend to stress-test increases in interest rates and credit or
liquidity spreads more often than decreases. Only the
foreign exchange rate stress tests are more balanced.
In the follow-up interviews arranged by the CGFS
task force, risk managers at reporting banks gave three
reasons for treating risks asymmetrically. They noted that
in the interest rate and credit areas, banks have asymmetric
exposures because of the nature of their business: an
increase in interest rates or credit spreads will generally
reduce bank profitability. In addition, risk managers sug-
gested that asymmetries may reflect a bank’s view that a
particular market event is more likely in the near future.
For example, some managers chose to run an equity crash
scenario in May 2000 because equity market valuations
were at historically high levels. A final reason cited for
the asymmetry of the scenarios is senior managers’interest
in ensuring that their institution is not exposed to the par-
ticular stress events they have experienced personally.
The high incidence of certain scenarios also suggests
that banks rely heavily on stress tests to uncover risks that
might escape detection by a statistical risk measure such
as VaR. For example, the 1994 global bond market crash
(stress-tested by nine banks) involved a common upward
movement in government bond yields in the United
States, Europe, and Japan. Because bond yields in these
markets are not tightly linked in normal times, a VaR
model using historical correlations could not quantify the
risk associated with such an event.
In the follow-up interviews, risk managers gave addi-
tional reasons for preferring stress tests to statistical mea-
sures as a tool for assessing certain kinds of risk. They
suggested that stress tests may be usefully applied to mar-
kets that lack good historical price data for conducting
statistical tests or markets in which illiquid conditions
produce asset price jumps and impede securities trading
during times of stress.6
For these reasons, emerging market risks are well
suited to stress testing, and indeed, a large number of
emerging market scenarios are reported in the survey.
Although only twenty-four banks run emerging markets
scenarios, banks that do perform the tests tend to run mul-
tiple scenarios across several different regions.
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VolatilityConsider, for example, the “country risk” scenarios.
These scenarios track a bank’s exposure to a stress event in
a single emerging market (country or region) with shocks
across multiple asset classes—a sovereign bond spread, an
exchange rate, and, less frequently, an equity index. Each
bank that reported a country risk scenario ran it for multiple
emerging markets, with several institutions reporting that
they base their country risk limits on the results of such
stress tests. Although the table reports seven banks running
nine such scenarios, the total number of stress tests would
be much higher if all country risk scenarios were counted
for each emerging market individually.
Variations in Stress Testing across Institutions
One of the striking findings of the survey is that the mag-
nitude of shocks used in stress testing varies substantially
among scenarios that on the surface look quite similar.
For example, the Black Monday 1987 scenarios reported
in the survey include declines in the S&P 500 stock price
index that range from 4 percent to 36 percent (the median
decline was 23 percent). In addition, cross-market effects
assumed within the 1987 stock market crash scenarios vary
widely. Only half of the scenarios include shocks to interest
rates, and of those, 60 percent include declining interest
rates and 40 percent include increasing rates. Similarly,
only a few institutions include equity volatility shocks as a
part of their stock market crash scenarios.
Risk managers suggested several reasons for the large
degree of heterogeneity in stress testing. Banks’ use of
different time horizons to define stress events—one day,
two weeks, or peak-to-trough7—leads to different shock
sizes even for historical scenarios, and to different
assumptions about cross-market shocks. In addition, the
diversity in cross-market effects across similar scenarios
may reflect differences in the underlying portfolios and
business lines of financial institutions. For example,
because the equity options market is dominated by a small
number of firms, only those firms with volatility expo-
sure choose to include equity volatility shocks in their
equity crash scenarios.
The Role of Stress Tests in Risk Management
How do financial institutions use stress tests in risk man-
agement? The CGFS survey represents the first effort to
investigate this question on a broad international scale.
The survey responses indicate that stress testing is a
standard risk management technique for the reporting
institutions (Table 2). All the banks use stress tests to
understand their risk profiles and to communicate their
risks to senior management. Information obtained in the
follow-up interviews suggests that senior managers gen-
erally examine the results of stress testing at regular high-
level “risk committee” meetings. About half the banks use
stress tests to conduct contingency planning for times of
market stress. One-quarter or fewer use stress tests to allo-
cate capital across business lines or to monitor liquidity
risk for a particular asset class.
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Table 1
Firm-wide Stress Test Scenarios
Number of Number of
Banks Scenarios
Equities 32 53
Black Monday 1987 20 20
Hypothetical stock market crashes 13 13
New Economy scenarios* 5 13
Other* 6 7
Interest rates 27 47
Other historical interest rate increases 91 6
Bond market crash 1994 9 9
Global tightening 6 7
U.S. tightening 5 5
Other historical interest rate declines 35
Other* 5 5
Emerging markets 24 56
Asia* 12 14
Latin America* 8 16
Country risk* 7 9
Russia* 7 8
Eastern Europe 4 4
Global emerging markets crises 3 4
Other 1 1
Credit 19 33




European stress 1992 11 11
European stress/weak Euro 5 5
European divergence 4 5
European boom/strong Euro 4 4
Japan 12 38
Interest rate increase scenarios* 5 11





Middle East crisis* 7 8
Commodity stress 5 7
North America 10 15
Weak dollar* 7 8
Strong dollar* 3 3
U.S. market-wide stress 3 3
Other 1 1
Other 9 11
Volatility disruption 3 4
Total 293
Notes: Scenarios based on historical events are in italics. An asterisk indicates a
mix of historical and hypothetical scenarios. A majority of the reporting banks use stress tests to set
limits on the size of trades and asset positions, and most
have adjusted trading positions in accordance with the
stress test results. Global dealer banks, with the largest
trading and derivatives operations, are more likely to use
stress tests in this way.
In the follow-up interviews, risk managers revealed
that responses to stress test results are handled on a case-
by-case basis. Banks use the trading limits established
through stress testing in combination with trading limits
derived from other information such as the size of posi-
tions, the sensitivity of a position to price changes, and
VaR model results. Risk managers reported a wide variety
of responses to a breach of a stress test limit, ranging from
a discussion between the risk manager and the business
unit about the reason for the breach to a mandatory
unwinding of positions. How a particular bank responds
depends on its attitude toward stress test limits, the size of
the breach, and market conditions. Even those banks that
do not use “hard” trading limits based on stress tests will
treat stress test results as a trigger for further inquiry.8
Several risk managers emphasized that stress tests were
often most informative in measuring how an institution’s
risk profile changes over time. Large changes in portfolio
valuations produced by a given stress test from one month
to the next were often considered more revealing than the
actual level of the stress test result. Risk managers regard
such changes as a sign that a firm’s risk profile has shifted
significantly enough to warrant further investigation. For
this reason, risk managers change scenarios rarely, and
often run the same stress test scenarios at regular intervals,
even when economic and financial conditions suggest that
some stress events are unlikely in the near term.
Most banks run at least some stress tests at a high fre-
quency (daily or weekly), although in interviews, some
risk managers noted that the more complicated scenarios
are costly to implement and can only be run at monthly or
quarterly intervals. Global dealer banks run stress tests at
a slightly higher frequency than do other internationally
active banks—a difference that reflects the dealer banks’
more active role in trading and market making.
All banks report that stress tests are conducted across
all trading operations in securities and derivatives; two-
thirds report that stress tests also cover their banking
book. While a minority of banks in both peer groups
include offline or spreadsheet deals and the specific risk
of individual securities in their stress tests, global dealer
banks are more likely to capture these types of risk.9
One-quarter of the banks report that some stress tests
allow for interaction of market risk and credit risk (the
risk of counterparty default). Risk managers indicated
that, at present, such interactions are limited to emerging
markets and other business lines in which market risk and
counterparty risk are likely to become closely linked dur-
ing times of stress.10
Conclusion
The survey of stress test scenarios conducted by the
Committee on the Global Financial System in 2000 pro-
vides information about both the types of risks that concern
large financial institutions and the role of stress tests in
the institutions’risk management programs:
 Stress test scenarios reflect a perceived asym-
metry in risks: negative shocks (crashes) are
stressed much more often than positive ones.
The largest number of reported scenarios focus
on equities and emerging markets.
 Despite these broad similarities, the stress test
scenarios themselves are quite heterogeneous.
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Table 2
How Financial Institutions Use Stress Tests
Percentage Responding Affirmatively
Global Internationally
Survey Questions and Responses All Banks Dealers Active Banks
How are stress test results used? (Check all that apply)
To communicate the firm’s risk
profile to senior management 100.0 100.0 100.0
To understand the nature of
the firm’s risk profile 95.3 94.7 95.8
To set limits 60.5 78.9 45.3
To conduct contingency planning 48.8 42.1 54.2
To monitor liquidity risk 25.6 31.6 20.8
To allocate capital 18.6 21.1 16.7
Have the results of stress tests ever directly led your firm to hedge 
or unwind a position?
Yes 65.1 73.7 58.3
How often are firm-wide stress tests run? (Check all that apply)
Daily 41.9 47.4 37.5
Weekly 46.5 42.1 50.0
Monthly 51.2 42.1 58.3
Quarterly 20.9 15.8 25.0
How often are firm-wide stress test results presented to senior
management? (Check all that apply)
Daily 23.3 31.6 16.7
Weekly 39.5 47.4 33.3
Monthly 53.5 31.6 70.8
Quarterly 23.3 26.3 20.8
Which business line risks are captured by your stress tests?
(Check all that apply)
Trading book 100.0 100.0 100.0
Banking book 67.4 68.4 66.7
Offline/spreadsheet deals 32.6 47.4 20.8
Specific risk of individual
securities 27.9 42.1 16.7
Do any of your stress tests allow for the interaction of market risk
and counterparty (default) credit risk?
Yes 25.6 42.1 12.5CURRENT ISSUES IN ECONOMICS AND FINANCE
The array of risks assessed is large, covering
every geographic region and all types of finan-
cial assets and derivatives. Scenarios vary
widely across firms as well. Even apparently
similar scenarios run by different firms can
diverge markedly in the size of the shocks and
the size and breadth of cross-market effects.
 Financial institutions rely heavily on stress tests
for markets and products whose risks may be
inadequately measured by statistical tools such
as VaR. Stress test scenarios usually involve
crises in which the historical asset price relation-
ships used in VaR modeling break down.
 Stress tests are universally used for reporting
on risks to senior management. The tests are
commonly used to assess risks across the trad-
ing and lending businesses of banks, and are
often used by the larger global dealer banks to
set trading limits.
Notes
1. For a discussion of the use of stress testing by large international
financial institutions, see CGFS (2000) and Fender and Gibson
(2001).
2. For a discussion of value-at-risk models, see Hendricks (1996)
or Linsmeier and Pearson (2000). VaR is a confidence interval in
which losses in excess of a chosen benchmark are estimated to
occur with a specified likelihood. A useful feature of VaR is that it
allows the aggregation of risk across different assets and risk factors
to provide estimates of the overall risk of a portfolio or institution.
3. The CGFS is chaired by Yutaka Yamaguchi, Deputy Governor of
the Bank of Japan. Alain Duchateau of the Banque de France/
Commission Bancaire headed the CGFS task force.
4. The survey questions and reporting forms were developed with
the aid of private-sector risk managers from several large interna-
tional financial institutions. Survey responses were collected by
central banks in the home country of the participating institutions.
5. Classification of the participating financial institutions was
done by the central banks in their home country.
6. Some stress test scenarios also simulated extreme illiquidity by
including trading constraints such as limits on the amount of an
asset that a trader could buy or sell over a particular time period.
7. The different time horizons may reflect different assumptions
about the availability of market liquidity in periods of stress.
8. According to risk managers, other responses to a breach of stress
test limits include the adoption of a “macro hedge” at the firm level.
9. Offline or spreadsheet deals typically represent new structured
financial products that are not yet fully incorporated in a bank’s risk
management information systems. The specific risk of an asset is
that portion of the asset’s price risk that is distinct from market-wide
price fluctuations. It is determined by characteristics that are unique
to the issuer of the security and can be reduced or eliminated with
sufficient diversification.
10. Risk managers noted that emerging market stress events pre-
cipitated by market risks could lead very quickly to credit risk
problems as falling asset prices transformed previously creditworthy
counterparties into poor credit risks.
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